Federal Government Contractors and Grantees Should Take Steps To Protect Their Patent Rights After the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Stanford v. Roche

The Supreme Court's new Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., et al., 563 U.S. ___ (2011) decision has significant implications for federally-funded inventions and any patents that may result. As Christopher Rissetto, Louis DePaul, and Stephanie Giese explain in this new alert, each federal government contractor and grantee should take the following steps:

  • Establish agreements with employees that require each employee to make present assignments to the contractor or grantee for inventions made during his or her employment.
  • Establish agreements with third parties, including consultants, that protect each party’s rights in inventions developed during collaborative efforts consistent with the terms of the government contract.
  • Recognize that, as a federal contractor or grantee, it may be in breach of its federal contract or grant if it fails to obtain: (1) an assignment (preferably a present assignment) of a federally funded invention from an employee; or (2) an agreement on rights in a federally funded invention from a third-party collaborating organization or consultant.
  • Recognize that the federal government may propose new rulemaking in connection with patent rights that may include regulations that require contractors to obtain (and perhaps certify that they have obtained) the assignments from employees, as well as agreements with collaborating organizations and consultants discussed above.
  • Understand that patent rights are not implemented in federal contracts and grants uniformly across the federal agencies and, as such, a federal government contractor or grantee should carefully review its rights and responsibilities under the patent rights clauses in each of its contracts or grants.
  • Recognize that under certain circumstances, a federal contractor or grantee should negotiate patent rights with the federal government.
  • Recognize that, pursuant to the definition of “subject invention” in a federal government grant or contract, the federal government may obtain rights in inventions conceived at private expense, but first reduced to practice using federal funding, or alternatively, conceived using federal funding, but first reduced to practice at private expense. 
  • Recognize that, as a federal government contractor or grantee, it may need to review the federal government contract or grant, as well as agreements made in connection with the contract or grant, to determine rights to a federally funded invention.
  • Recognize that, to determine rights to a federally funded invention, third parties acquiring patent rights from a federal government contractor or grantee may need to review the federal government contract or grant, as well as agreements made in connection with the contract or grant. 
  • While not specifically addressed by the Supreme Court, recognize that the precedent set in the Stanford v. Roche decision is likely to apply to large, for-profit companies, as well as to small businesses and nonprofit organizations that are performing federal government contracts or grants. See Exec. Order No. 12,591, para. 1(b)(4), 52 Fed. Reg. 13,414 (Apr. 10, 1987) (citingPresident’s Memorandum to the Heads of the Executive Departments and Agencies, Government Patent Policy (Feb. 18, 1983)).

Please contact one of the authors for more information regarding intellectual property rights under federal government contracts and grants.

So Long, Eastern District of Texas (Patent and Product Liability) Rocket Docket?

The Recorder (via Law.Com) has an article today discussing the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision In re Volkswagen of America Inc. and its ramifications for patent litigation.

The case involves the often-discussed (some would say notorious) Eastern District of Texas. The Rio Grande Valley and Gulf Coast of Texas are repeat offenders on the American Tort Reform Association's "Judicial Hellholes" list. Both patent and product liability cases historically have made their way because of the plaintiff-friendly nature of this jurisdiction, and judges in the Eastern District often rejected venue challenges under the reasoning that if a product was available in the jurisdiction, that was enough for venue—even if no other connection linked the case to the Eastern District of Texas.

In Volkswagen, however, an en banc panel of the Fifth Circuit issued a writ of mandamus ordering a product liability matter transferred from the Marshall Division of the Eastern District of Texas to the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas, where the underlying accident took place.

The District Court had denied Volkswagen's motion to transfer venue, and a panel of the Fifth Circuit denied its original petition for writ of mandamus, out of deference for plaintiff's choice of forum. That plaintiff elected to file in the Eastern District was—literally—the only connection between the case and the Eastern District of Texas; "all other factors relevant to transfer of venue weigh overwhelmingly in favor of the Northern District of Texas." After a rehearing by a second panel that resulted in the opposite conclusion and plaintiff's en banc petition, the Fifth Circuit finally resolved the issue in a decision that should help corporate parties—whether patent plaintiffs, or patent or product liability defendants—navigate the appropriate venue rules.

As the case establishes, no longer is it sufficient for the Eastern District to keep a case because "because the product is available in Marshall, and that for this reason jury duty would be no burden." This rationale for establishing venue "stretches logic in a manner that eviscerates the public interest" that considerations such as where the incident occurred and where the witnesses and evidence are located tries to protect. It also fairly "could apply virtually to any judicial district or division in the United States; it leaves no room for consideration of those actually affected—directly and indirectly—by the controversies and events giving rise to a case." Although the dissenters believed the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to transfer, the principles emphasized in Volkswagen are both reasonable and logical.