Senate Finance Committee Report Inquires into Physician-Owned Distributors

This post was written by Joseph W. Metro, Gina M. Cavalier and Jouya Rastegar.

On June 9, 2011, Senator Orrin Hatch released a report by the Senate Finance Committee Minority Staff that outlines key concerns about Physician-Owned Distributors (“PODs”), specifically regarding the lack of regulatory oversight and clear guidance from the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (“OIG”). The Committee Minority’s report, Physician Owned Distributors (PODs): An Overview of Key Issues and Potential Areas for Congressional Oversight, set forth findings of committee staff who spoke to over fifty people and reviewed thousands of pages of documents. In addition to the report, the Chairman and Ranking Members of the Senate Financial Committee, Special Committee on Aging, and Judiciary Committee sent letters on the same day to the Administrator for Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”)and the Inspector General of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) requesting further inquiry into the concerns set out in the Senator Hatch’s report.

The crux of the Committee’s concern with PODs is the potential for fraud and abuse the Committee believes to be inherently found in PODs. Historically, implantable medical devices (these are what the report focuses on) have been sold to hospitals and surgery centers directly from the device manufacturers or through independent distributors. More recently, PODs have come into existence to buy the devices from manufacturers and sell them to hospitals or surgery centers. PODs are mostly comprised of small groups of physicians who create companies to distribute, and in some cases manufacture, medical devices for implantation in surgeries. The large majority of products sold by PODs are sold to hospitals where their own physician investors practice. This is where the concern stems from—physicians’ potential ability to profit through distribution markups on products they are selling through the PODs in which they are owners or investors, particularly where the PODs likewise solicit discounts from manufacturers based on preferred positioning or other “captive” volume.

The report: (1) explains the history of PODs and their business models; (2) describes the concerns for fraud and abuse; (3) highlights the regulatory environment in which they exist; and (4) concludes by outlining what the should happen to address concerns. The nature of PODs creates financial incentives for physician owners to use devices that yield personal financial return, which may implicate the federal anti-kickback statute’s prohibition on inducements to purchase or order items covered under federal health care programs. The report listed anecdotal and evidence-based reasons for concern, such as instances of surgeons performing eight to ten procedures on elderly patients despite the serious health risks, stories of surgeons redoing previous surgeries to use their own POD products, an analysis from the Quality Implant Coalition, a coalition of manufacturers of implantable medical devices, which showed claims data from one hospital indicating a 300 percent increase in spinal fusion surgery after a spinal product POD moved into the hospital’s area, and an April 2010 Journal of the American Medical Association study that found a fifteen-fold increase in the number of spinal fusion surgeries for Medicare patients from 2002-2007, the period during which PODs became a more prevalent business model. On the other hand, the report mentioned a paper written by a POD, which was presented at the American Association of Orthopedic Surgeons 2009 annual meeting, in which the POD asserted that its business model helped saved the hospital with which it was affiliated thirty-four percent over a two year-period—a total savings of over one million dollars.

The legal implications of the business of PODs have not been entirely clear because the regulatory environment in which they find themselves is murky. As highlighted in the Senate Finance Committee report, the OIG issued written guidance on the issue of PODs and expressed the need to carefully review and closely scrutinize these entities under fraud and abuse laws and its Special Fraud Alert relating to joint venture arrangements. Similarly, CMS has declined to regulate PODs under the Stark law. However, the Senate Finance Committee report indicated that there has been a lack of any recent or more specific guidance on this topic. Further the report noted that POD arrangements might implicate the Sunshine Act’s reporting requirements relating to manufacturer financial arrangements with physicians, for which HHS has not yet issued guidance.

The report, as well as the letters to the HHS Inspector General and CMS Administrator, call for several measures to address concerns: (1) further inquiring into and closely examining PODs and their current structures and activities; (2) providing additional regulatory guidance from OIG and/or Congress; (3) including the distribution model of PODs into CMS’ final definition of “applicable manufacturers,” in order to require PODs to fall under the Sunshine Act financial reporting requirements; (4) accounting for the POD business model when CMS promulgates the final Accountable Care Organization regulation to protect against abuses posed by PODs; and (5) developing recommendations for further actions.
 

CMS' Oversight of Security Rule "Not Sufficient" According to the OIG

This post was written by Gina M. Cavalier, Vicky G. Gormanly and Brad M. Rostolsky.

On May 16, 2011, the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) published a report with the results from its nationwide review of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS’”) oversight of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”). In its review, the OIG sought to determine the sufficiency of CMS’ oversight and enforcement actions pertaining to hospitals’ implementation of the HIPAA Security Rule. Pursuant to the Security Rule, covered entities, such as hospitals, must implement technical, physical, and administrative safeguards for the protection of electronic protected health information (“ePHI”). According to the OIG, CMS’ oversight and enforcement actions were “not sufficient,” leaving limited assurance of the security of hospitals’ ePHI.

The report details the results from the OIG’s audits of seven hospitals. The audits disclosed “numerous internal control weaknesses.” Specifically, the OIG identified 151 vulnerabilities in the systems and controls intended to protect ePHI. Of these vulnerabilities, 124 were categorized as “high impact.” These vulnerabilities placed the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of ePHI at risk. The consequences of the high impact vulnerabilities is that it (1) may result in the highly costly loss of major tangible assets or resources; (2) may significantly violate, harm, or impede an organization’s mission, reputation, or interest; or (3) may result in human death or serious injury. 

Pharmaceutical Executives and In-House Counsel Beware: U.S. District Court Affirms Exclusion of Former Purdue Executives Under "Responsible Corporate Officer" Doctrine

This post was written by Elizabeth B. Carder-Thompson and Katie C. Pawlitz.

On December 13, 2010, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia affirmed the decision of Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (the “Secretary”) excluding three former pharmaceutical executives for twelve years from participation in Medicare, Medicaid, and all other federal health care programs. The exclusion – the latest weapon in governmental assaults on pharmaceutical company wrongdoing – was imposed by the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services (“OIG”). The executives, who included the company’s former general counsel, were excluded notwithstanding the fact that they asserted no knowledge of the misbranding conduct for which their former employer, Purdue Frederick Company (“Purdue”), previously settled with the government.

The decision illustrates the government’s enhanced focus on individual liability and punishment in the context of fraud and abuse by health care entities, and it represents a significant development in enforcement activity in this area.

Now more than ever, we urge our health care clients – providers, suppliers, and manufacturers alike – to consider the potential impact of the OIG’s permissive exclusion authority when defending against allegations of fraud or abuse involving federal health care programs. To read our full alert, summarizing the court’s opinion and related background, click here.

New Guidance on the OIG's Ability To Exclude Owners, Officers and Managing Employees; Related FDA Statements on Pharmaceutical Executives

This post was written by Elizabeth B. Carder-Thompson, Jennifer A. Goldstein, Thomas W. Greeson, Laura A. Mastrangelo, Katie C. Pawlitz, and Paul W. Pitts.

On October 20, 2010, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Health and Human Services issued significant new guidance for implementing its permissive exclusion authority under section 1128(b)(15) of the Social Security Act. Section 1128(b)(15) specifically authorizes the OIG to exclude an owner, officer or managing employee of a sanctioned entity, i.e., health care provider, supplier, or manufacturer, from participation in federal health care programs. The OIG’s new guidance sets out non-binding factors that the OIG intends to consider in deciding whether to impose exclusion on owners, officers and managing employees.

In addition, there have been recent statements by officials of the Food & Drug Administration concerning the bringing of misdemeanor charges against executives of entities that promote off-label uses of their products. Taken together, these OIG and FDA developments clearly signal that increasing investigative and enforcement activity is forthcoming regarding the owners, officers and managing employees of providers, suppliers, and manufacturers alike.

For a more detailed summary of the OIG’s new guidance and the need to take proactive measures against potential abuses and misconduct, read our full alert.

CMS Clarifies Telemarketing Rules for DME Suppliers

This post was written by Elizabeth B. Carder-Thompson and Debra A. McCurdy.

The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has issued new "Telemarketing FAQs" to supplement the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) recent revisions to its Special Fraud Alert on Telemarketing by Durable Medical Equipment Suppliers. As you may recall, in January 2010, the OIG amended the Special Fraud Alert to add a warning about suppliers contacting a beneficiary before the supplier receives written beneficiary consent, as it may violate the statutory provision that prohibits Durable Medical Equipment (DME) suppliers from making unsolicited telephone calls to Medicare beneficiaries regarding the furnishing of a Medicare-covered item. Specifically, the OIG stated that it "has also been made aware of instances when DME suppliers, notwithstanding the clear statutory prohibition, contact Medicare beneficiaries by telephone based solely on treating physicians’ preliminary written or verbal orders prescribing DME for the beneficiaries." According to the OIG, the "physician’s preliminary written or verbal order is not a substitute for the requisite written consent of a Medicare beneficiary."

In response to this new language, Reed Smith contacted the OIG to discuss the adverse impact this policy would have on timely beneficiary access to medically necessary equipment ordered by a physician, since some suppliers call a beneficiary to arrange for equipment deliveries upon receiving an initial physician verbal order. The OIG has just sent us a copy of new CMS Telemarketing FAQs that seek to clarify certain aspects of the revised Special Fraud Alert. Notably, CMS clarifies that there are circumstances in which a supplier may contact a beneficiary based on receipt of a physicians' order if the physician contacts the supplier with the beneficiary's knowledge:

Question 3: Is a supplier contacting the beneficiary based on the receipt of a physician order considered an “unsolicited” contact?

Answer 3: If a physician contacts a supplier on behalf of a beneficiary with the beneficiary’s knowledge, and then a supplier contacts the beneficiary to confirm or gather information needed to provide that particular covered item (including delivery and billing information), then that contact would not be considered “unsolicited.” Please note that the beneficiary need only be aware that a supplier will be contacting him/her regarding the prescribed covered item, recognizing that the appropriate supplier may not have been identified at the time of consultation.

On the other hand, if the beneficiary is not aware that the physician would be contacting the supplier on the beneficiary's behalf, the contact may be prohibited.

Question 4: What if a supplier contacts the beneficiary based solely on the physician order (and therefore the contact is without the beneficiary’s knowledge that the physician would be contacting a supplier on the beneficiary’s behalf)?

Answer 4: Then that contact would be considered “unsolicited” and, depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, may be prohibited.