Third Circuit Holds That MDL Judges Can't Reverse Pre-Transfer Orders Absent Extraordinary Circumstances

This post written by Eric Buhr.

In a precedential decision issued Thursday, In Re: Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust Litigation (MDL 1782), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reinstated a district court order compelling arbitration of antitrust claims, an order which another district court judge vacated after the case was transferred to a federal Multi-District Litigation (MDL)s. Based on the law of the case doctrine, the Court of Appeals held that MDL judges may not overturn an order of the transferor court absent a finding of extraordinary circumstances - a conclusion that has broad ramifications for MDL proceedings in general.

The In Re Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust Litigation case began in 2003, when Bellevue Drug Co. and several other pharmacies and associations sued AdvancePCS, a pharmacy benefits manager now known as CaremarkPCS, Inc for antitrust violations. In 2004, AdvancePCS moved to compel arbitration of all of the Plaintiffs' claims based on a contractual arbitration clause, and the district judge, Judge Eduardo Robreno of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, granted the motion to compel arbitration and stayed the district court action. 

Two years later, though, the case was transferred to an MDL pending in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania before Judge John P. Fullam. There, Judge Fullam lifted the stay and vacated the order for arbitration. Although Judge Fullam admitted the orders compelling arbitration were "clearly appropriate under the Federal Arbitration Act," he felt that an order vacating the arbitration order would help expedite the case. In support of his ruling, he explained his belief that a transferee judge under the multidistrict litigation statute had the power to vacate or modify any order of a transferor court bearing on pretrial matters.

The Court of Appeals clearly disagreed, stating that "there is nothing in the rules adopted by the Joint Panel on Multidistrict Litigation that authorized a transferee judge to vacate or modify the order of a transferor judge."   Although Judge Fullam relied, in part, on portions of the Manual for Complex Litigation suggesting that a transferee judge may vacate or modify orders of the transferor court, the Third Circuit dismissed that argument. The Court explained that "if Judge Fullam's interpretation of the statute were accurate, litigation could begin anew with each MDL transfer…Moreover, we do not believe that Congress intended that a 'Return to Go' card would be dealt to parties involved in MDL transfers." 

Ultimately, the Third Circuit agreed that the transfer of a case to an MDL does not confer more power on a transferee court; its powers are commensurate with those the transferor court has absent the transfer. Therefore, under ordinary application of the law of the case doctrine, an MDL court may only revisit past orders upon a finding of "extraordinary circumstances". Some recognized examples justifying exceptions and revisiting old orders anew include: (1) when new evidence becomes available; (2) when a supervening new law has been announced; (3) when there is a need to clarify or correct an earlier ambiguous ruling; and (4) when the order might lead to an unjust result. Since the MDL judge had not relied on on any such exception to the law of the case doctrine, the Third Circuit reinstated the original order by the transferor court.  

So Long, Eastern District of Texas (Patent and Product Liability) Rocket Docket?

The Recorder (via Law.Com) has an article today discussing the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision In re Volkswagen of America Inc. and its ramifications for patent litigation.

The case involves the often-discussed (some would say notorious) Eastern District of Texas. The Rio Grande Valley and Gulf Coast of Texas are repeat offenders on the American Tort Reform Association's "Judicial Hellholes" list. Both patent and product liability cases historically have made their way because of the plaintiff-friendly nature of this jurisdiction, and judges in the Eastern District often rejected venue challenges under the reasoning that if a product was available in the jurisdiction, that was enough for venue—even if no other connection linked the case to the Eastern District of Texas.

In Volkswagen, however, an en banc panel of the Fifth Circuit issued a writ of mandamus ordering a product liability matter transferred from the Marshall Division of the Eastern District of Texas to the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas, where the underlying accident took place.

The District Court had denied Volkswagen's motion to transfer venue, and a panel of the Fifth Circuit denied its original petition for writ of mandamus, out of deference for plaintiff's choice of forum. That plaintiff elected to file in the Eastern District was—literally—the only connection between the case and the Eastern District of Texas; "all other factors relevant to transfer of venue weigh overwhelmingly in favor of the Northern District of Texas." After a rehearing by a second panel that resulted in the opposite conclusion and plaintiff's en banc petition, the Fifth Circuit finally resolved the issue in a decision that should help corporate parties—whether patent plaintiffs, or patent or product liability defendants—navigate the appropriate venue rules.

As the case establishes, no longer is it sufficient for the Eastern District to keep a case because "because the product is available in Marshall, and that for this reason jury duty would be no burden." This rationale for establishing venue "stretches logic in a manner that eviscerates the public interest" that considerations such as where the incident occurred and where the witnesses and evidence are located tries to protect. It also fairly "could apply virtually to any judicial district or division in the United States; it leaves no room for consideration of those actually affected—directly and indirectly—by the controversies and events giving rise to a case." Although the dissenters believed the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to transfer, the principles emphasized in Volkswagen are both reasonable and logical.